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THE NEED FOR AN ADDITIONAL NOTICE AND
COMMENT PERIOD WHEN FINAL
RULES DIFFER SUBSTANTIALLY
FROM INTERIM RULES
Through the promulgation of rules and regulations that carry the
force of law, federal administrative agencies have a considerable im-
pact on the personal and proprietary interests of American citizens.' In
order "to afford parties affected by administrative [rulemaking] a
means of knowing what their rights are and how they may be pro-
tected,"2 agencies are required to follow the rulemaking procedures en-
acted by Congress in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).3
Compliance with these procedural requirements is designed to ensure
informed and rational agency rulemaking; courts therefore rely on
strict review of an agency's rulemaking procedures to achieve substan-
tively sound administrative law.4
I. The pervasive impact of the administrative process is reflected by the number of subjects
it covers, including air and water pollution; prices of electricity, gas, telephone, and other utility
services; rates, schedules, and services of airlines, street cars, and buses; wholesomeness of meat
and poultry; fraud or inadequate disclosure in the sale of securities; conditions in locomotives,
ships, airplanes, bridges, and elevators; unfair labor practices; false advertising; the adequacy of
safety appliances; unemployment compensation; bank deposits and credits; and wages. K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 3 (3d ed. 1972).
2. S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1945) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT],
reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, S. Doc. No. 248,
79th Cong., 2d Sess. 193 (1946) [hereinafter cited as APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
3. Ch. 324, §§ 1-12, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (current version codified in scattered sections of 5
U.S.C.). See text accompanying notes 9-17 infra.
4. See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1028-31 & n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Interna-
tional Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, C.J., concur-
ring). In Weyerhaeuser the court stated its willingness "to entrust the Agency with wide-ranging
regulatory discretion. . . so long as we are assured that its promulgation process as a whole and
in each of its major aspects provides a degree of public awareness, understanding, and participa-
tion commensurate with the complexity and intrusiveness of the resulting regulations." 590 F.2d
at 1028. See also McGowan, Reflections on Rulemaking Review, 53 TUL. L. REV. 681, 690-96
(1979).
Judicial review of agency rulemaking is not restricted solely to the agency's promulgation
procedures but also extends to the substantive aspects of the rule or regulation. Although the
courts are permitted to conduct a "searching and careful" inquiry into the facts supporting the
rule, "the ultimate [substantive] standard of review is a narrow one." Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971). The APA empowers courts to set aside only infor-
mal agency action that is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accord-
ance with law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976). Strict and careful review of an agency's rulemaking
procedures, therefore, remains the primary safeguard against arbitrary agency action. For sum-
maries of the divergent judicial positions concerning the scope and standard of review of informal
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Serious questions about the adequacy of agency rulemaking proce-
dures arise when an agency publishes a final rule that differs substan-
tially from its earlier proposed or interim rule. The primary concern in
such situations is that the proposed or interim rule may fail to give
interested parties adequate notice of the scope and substance of the
final rule.5 The provision of adequate notice is particularly important
with respect to rules that undergo substantial revision because it en-
sures that interested parties are given a meaningful opportunity to par-
ticipate in the rulemaking process and are not completely unprepared
for the significant changes embodied in the agency's final rule.
Both Congress and the courts have considered the problem of sub-
stantial change between an agency's proposed and final rules; they have
failed, however, to consider separately substantial change between an
agency's interim and final rules.6 This failure must be remedied; theimpact of substantial changes on parties subject to the agency's rule
increases significantly when that change occurs between a rule's interim
and final stages.7
This comment examines the problem of substantially revised rules
in light of the purposes behind the APA's notice and comment provi-
sions.8 It first traces the development of stricter rulemaking notice re-
quirements and explains why these developments have raised questions
about the sufficiency of notice provided by proposed and interim rules
that differ significantly from their final form. Second, it outlines the
factors courts have applied when reviewing final rules that differ from
their proposed form and discusses why these factors must be strictly
applied. Finally, it examines the distinctive characteristics of interim
rules and argues that these characteristics compel a more frequent im-
position of an additional notice and comment period when an agency
makes substantial changes in a rule between its interim and final stages.
I. THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT'S
RULEMAKING PROVISIONS
The APA's informal9 or "notice and comment" provisions t° pre-
agency rulemaking, see K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES §§ 29.01-1, .01-8, at
654-83 (1976); Note, Judicial Review of Agency Rule Making, 14 GA. L. REV. 300 (1980).
5. The APA's notice requirements are set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1976). See text accom-
panying notes 26-33 infra.
6. See note 94 infra and text accompanying notes 93-94 infra.
7. See notes 146-50 infra and accompanying text.
8. See text accompanying notes 31-32 infra.
9. The term "informal" describes rulemaking that is not subject to the requirement of a
formal hearing. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1976). The procedural requirements for formal, on-the-
record rulemaking are contained in id. §§ 556, 557. The formal rulemaking procedure requires
"trial type" hearings, including the right to submit evidence and to cross-examine. See id.; B.
SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 172-73 (1976).
10. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c) (1976). These sections provide in part:
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scribe the minimum procedural requirements I that agencies must fol-
low when promulgating substantive' 2 rules or regulations. These
minimum requirements involve a four-step process of administrative
rulemaking. First, to initiate this process, an agency must publish a
notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register.' 3 This notice
must state the time, place, and nature of the rulemaking proceedings; it
must refer to the legal authority for the rule and state "either the terms
or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and
issues involved."' 4 Second, after the required notice is published, the
agency must "give interested persons an opportunity to participate in
the rule making through submission of written data, views or argu-
ments with or without the opportunity for oral presentation."'15 These
two steps constitute the notice and comment period. Third, after con-
sidering the information submitted during the notice and comment pe-
riod, the agency must "incorporate in the rules adopted a concise
(b) General notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the Federal Regis-
ter. . . . The notice shall include-
(1) a statement of the time, place, and nature of public rule making proceed-
ings;
(2) reference to the legal authority under which the rule is proposed; and
(3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the
subjects and issues involved ...
(c) After notice required by this section, the agency shall give interested persons an
opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of written data, views,
or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation. After consideration of
the relevant matter presented, the agency shall incorporate in the rules adopted a concise
general statement of their basis and purpose.
11. H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1946) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT],
reprinted in APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 2, at 259; SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at
14, reprinted in APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 2, at 200. See also Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978) (gener-
ally speaking, section 553 "established the maximum procedural requirements that Congress was
willing to have the courts impose upon agencies in conducting rulemaking procedures"); A.O.
Smith Corp. v. FTC, 396 F. Supp. 1125, 1133 (D. Del. 1975),a 'din part, vacated in part on other
grounds, 530 F.2d 515 (3d Cir. 1976); 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.01, at 360
(1958); Auerbach, Informal Rule Making: .4 Proposed Relationship Between Administrative Proce-
dures and Judicial Review, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 15, 22 (1977).
12. The notice and comment provisions of 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976) do not apply "to interpreta-
tive rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure or practice."
Id. § 553(b)(3)(A). Although the distinction between substantive rules and general statements of
policy has been described as a "fuzzy product," I K. DAVIS, supra note 11, § 5.01, at 290, substan-
tive rules are generally defined as rules that relate to and establish standards of conduct that have
the force of law. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. FPC, 506 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1974); American Meat
Inst. v. Bergland, 459 F. Supp. 1308, 1314 (D.D.C. 1978).
13. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1976).
14. Id. § 553(b)(3).
15. Id. § 553(c).
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general statement of their basis and purpose."' 6 Finally, the agency is
required to publish the final substantive rule at least thirty days before
its effective date.17
Two good-cause exceptions in the APA permit an agency to forego
initially the notice and comment procedures and publish rules that are
effective immediately. First, section 553(b)(3)(B)S permits agencies to
dispense with the prior notice and comment period whenever they de-
termine that "notice and public procedure [would be] impracticable
...or contrary to the public interest."' 9 Second, section 553(d)(3) 20
allows agencies that demonstrate good cause to dispense with the
thirty-day deferral period between a rule's publication and its effective
date.2' If an agency satisfies the good-cause requirement in both sec-
tions, it may promulgate rules without prior notice and comment and
make those rules effective immediately. 22 Rules promulgated in this
16. Id.
17. Id. § 553(d):
The required publication or service of a substantive rule shall be made not less than 30
days before its effective date except-() a substantive rule which grants or recognizes an
exemption or relieves a restriction; (2) interpretative rules and statements of policy; or (3)
as otherwise provided by the agency for good cause found and published with the rule.
18. Id. § 553(b)(3)(B).
19. Id. According to the legislative history of the APA, " '[i]mpracticable' means a situation
in which the due and required execution of the agency functions would be unavoidably prevented
by its undertaking public rule-making proceedings." SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 14, re-
printed in APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 2, at 200. Public interest means that "public
rulemaking procedures shall not prevent an agency from operating and that, on the other hand,
lack of public interest in rule making warrants an agency to dispense with public procedure." Id.
20. 5 U.S.C. § 553(d)(3) (1976).
21. The legislative history of the APA notes that deferral of the effective date of a rule is
designed to provide a reasonable time for parties to prepare for the effect of the rule and to take
any other action that the issuance of the rule may prompt. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 15,
reprinted in APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 2, at 201. The Senate report also noted that
the good-cause exception in this section is not an escape clause that may be arbitrarily exercised; it
requires legitimate grounds supported in law and fact. Id.
The House report, interpreting the good-cause exception in section 553(d)(3), stated:
Many rules. . . may be made operative in less than 30 days because of inescapable or
unavoidable limitations of time, because of the demonstrable urgency of the conditions
they are designed to correct, and because the parties subject to them may during the
usually protracted hearing and decision procedures anticipate the regulation.
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 11, at 26, reprinted in APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 2, at
260.
22. A recent conffict has arisen among the courts of appeals concerning the construction and
interpretation of the APA's good-cause exceptions. The cases involved Environmental Protection
Agency pollution standards promulgated pursuant to the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977,
Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). See United
States Steel Corp. v. EPA, 605 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1035 (1980); Sharon
Steel Corp. v. EPA, 597 F.2d 377 (3d Cir. 1979); United States Steel Corp. v. EPA, 595 F.2d 207
(5th Cir. 1979). The issue in these cases was whether statutory time constraints alone constitute
good cause for dispensing with prior notice and comment procedures. This comment, however, is
concerned with interim rules that have been properly promulgated and does not discuss the ques-
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fashion are referred to as "interim rules." More often, however, the
agency will permit a limited opportunity' for prior comment and then
publish an immediately effective rule pursuant to the good-cause ex-
ception in section 553(d)(3). 23 Rules promulgated in this manner are
known as "interim final rules." 24 An agency that publishes interim
rules satisfies the APA's rulemaking requirements by providing a pe-
riod of notice and comment after the rules' publication.25
The legislative history of the APA 26 indicates that an agency's no-
tice of proposed rulemaking is intended to "fairly apprise interested
parties of the issues involved, so that they [can] present responsive data
or argument." 27 To achieve this objective, the Final Report of the At-
torney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure28 suggests
that notice of the scope of the proposed rules should be as particular
and definite as the agency deems practicable; if possible, the text of
proposed or tentative rules should be made part of the notice.2 9 The
Committee also found that public rulemaking procedures "are likely to
tion of what constitutes good cause under the APA. For discussion of this question and its poten-
tial impact on notice and comment rulemaking, see Comment, Agency Discretion to Accept
Comment in Informal Rulemaking: What Constitutes "Good Cause" Under the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act?, 1980 B.Y.U. L. REV. 93; Note, The "Good Cause" Exceptions: Danger to Notice and
Comment Requirements Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 68 GEO. L.J. 765 (1980).
23. 5 U.S.C. § 553(d)(3) (1976).
24. The term "interim rule" is used in this comment as an inclusive term comprising both
"interim" and "interim final" rules.
25. This use of post-promulgation notice and comment procedures for interim rules is sup-
ported by the APA's legislative history. In its report on the Act, the Senate noted, "where author-
ity beneficial to the public does not become operative until a rule is issued, the agency may
promulgate the necessary rule immediately and rely upon supplemental procedures ... to satisfy
the requirements of [the APA]." SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 14, reprinted in APA LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY, supra note 2, at 200.
26. For a complete summary of the legislative history of the Administrative Procedure Act,
see LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, S. Doc. No. 248, 79th
Cong., 2d Sess. 193 (1946), reprinted in part in [1946] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1195.
27. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 14, reprintedin APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
2, at 200. The House of Representatives elaborated somewhat on this interpretation, noting that
"[p]rior to public procedures agencies must conduct such nonpublic studies or investigations as
will enable them to formulate issues, or where possible to issue proposed or tentative rules for the
purpose of public proceedings. Summaries and reports may also be issued as aids in securing
public comment or suggestions." HousE REPORT, supra note 11, at 24, reprinted in APA LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY, supra note 2, at 258.
28. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMM. ON ADMINISTRATIV PROCEDURE, FINAL REPORT ON AD-
MINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1941) [hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT]. President Roosevelt established this committee in
1939 to make a thorough survey of existing administrative practices and procedures and to suggest
possible improvements. See FINAL REPORT, supra at 1.
29. FINAL REPORT, supra note 28, at 228. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GEN-
ERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 29 (1947): "Where able to do so, an
agency may state the proposed rule itself or the substance of the rule in the notice required by
section 4(a). On the other hand, the agency, if it desires, may issue a more general 'description of
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be diffuse and of little real value either to the participating parties or to
the agency, unless their subject matter is indicated in advance. ' 30
These reports and subsequent judicial interpretations indicate that the
APA's notice and comment provisions serve two important functions:
they increase procedural fairness by ensuring that interested parties
learn of proposed official action before it is taken,31 and they encourage
a mature consideration of rules through public participation in the
rulemaking process. 32
The content of an agency's notice is an important procedural ele-
ment because it establishes the subjects, issues, and data for commiient.
The content of the notice determines in large part the quality and scope
of the comments that interested parties will submit.33 Inadequate no-
tice can therefore preclude public comment on certain aspects of a
rulemaking proposal. This preclusion prevents the agency from receiv-
ing the benefit of valuable public insight and information. More im-
portant, it leaves the public unaware of significant provisions of the
rule before its final publication.
Courts have often upheld rules and regulations promulgated by
agencies, refusing to substitute their judgment for that of the agency
because the rules and regulations concern areas of technical complexity
that lie outside judicial expertise.34 The courts have assumed that no-
the subjects and issues involved.' " See also 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6:25,
at 570-72 (2d ed. 1978).
30. FINAL REPORT, supra note 28, at 108.
31. See Saint Francis Memorial Hosp. v. Weinberger, 413 F. Supp. 323, 331 (N.D. Cal.
1976); Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The Limits 0/Judicial Review, 59 COR-
NELL L. REV. 375, 379 (1974). Judge Wright noted that
there is one sense in which the notion of "fairness" may be applied to administrative
rulemaking. Put simply, thepublic is treated unfairly when a rulemaker hides his crucial
decisions, or his reasons for them, or when he fails to give good faith attention to all the
information and contending views relevant to the issues before him.
Id. (emphasis in original).
32. See Texaco, Inc. v. FPC, 412 F.2d 740, 744 (3d Cir. 1969); FINAL REPORT, supra note 28,
at 103: "[Public] [p]articipation . . .in the rule making process is essential in order to permit
administrative agencies to inform themselves and to afford adequate safeguards to private inter-
ests." See also National Retired Teachers Ass'n v. United States Postal Serv., 430 F.Supp. 141,
147 (D.D.C. 1977), a'd, 593 F.2d 1360 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Saint Francis Memorial Hosp. v. Wein-
berger, 413 F. Supp. 323, 331 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
33. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 14, and HOUSE REPORT, supra note 11, at 24,
reprinted in APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 2, at 200,258; 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 402, 405
(1975).
34. See FPC v. Florida Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453,463 (1972); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541
F.2d 1, 36 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976); International Harvester Co. v. Ruckel-
shaus, 478 F.2d 615, 647 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role
ofthe Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 509, 511 (1974); Woodward & Levin, In De/ense ofDeerence:
JudiciglRevlew ofAgencyAction, 31 AD. L. REV. 329, 341-44 (1979) (addressing the shortcomings
of S. 111, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979), which attempted to amend 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976) by elimi-
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tice and comment rulemaking, by virtue of its accessibility to public
scrutiny, will achieve rational results.35 Underlying this assumption is
the belief that an agency, by exposing its rulemaking process to public
scrutiny and comment, will be better informed of important considera-
tions and thus better able to make rational decisions.3 6
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE NOTICE REQUIREMENT
The language of section 553(b)(3) 37 provides little guidance for de-
termining what constitutes sufficient notice of proposed rulemaking.
Congress and the courts have therefore played major roles in interpret-
ing and developing the APA's notice requirement. Early judicial inter-
pretations tended to give agencies wide latitude in formulating the
content of their published notice of proposed rulemaking. An agency
was not required to publish a proposed rule or to make available all the
important information it used to formulate a final rule.38 Nor was it
required to include a summary of the rule's expected effects. 39 Rather,
courts considered agency notice sufficient if it simply provided inter-
ested parties with general knowledge of the subjects and issues in-
volved in the rulemaking proceeding. 40
nating the presumption of validity afforded agency rules and regulations and instead requiring the
agency to uphold the rule by clear and convincing evidence).
35. See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1978); cf. Pacific Gas &
Elec. Co. v. FPC, 506 F.2d 33, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("A court reviewing a rule that was adopted
pursuant to [an] extensive rulemaking process will defer to the agency's judgment if the rule satis-
fies the minimal criterion of reasonableness").
36. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 28, at 101-02:
[An administrative agency] investigates and makes discretionary choices within its field
of specialization. The reason for its existence is that it is expected to bring to its task
greater familiarity with the subject than legislators . . . . But its knowledge is rarely
complete, and it must always learn the frequently clashing viewpoints of those whom its
regulations will affect.
[Ilts procedures. . . should be adapted to giving adequate opportunity to all per-
sons affected to present their views, the facts within their knowledge, and the dangers
and benefits of alternative courses. They should also be adapted to eliciting. . . the
information, facts, and probabilities which are necessary to fair and intelligent action.
37. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3) (1976). See note 10 supra.
38. See, eg., Buckeye Cablevision, Inc. v. FCC, 387 F.2d 220, 226 n.26 (D.C. Cir. 1967);
Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, 209 F.2d 717, 723-24 (10th Cir. 1954), rev'don other grounds,
348 U.S. 492 (1955); Willapoint Oysters, Inc. v. Ewing, 174 F.2d 676, 684-85 (9th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 338 U.S. 860 (1949).
39. See cases cited note 38 supra. For an example of a recent statute that requires the agency
to include a summary of the rule's expected effects, see 42 U.S.C. § 7191(b)(1) (Supp. III 1979).
See also note 46 infra.
40. See, ag., Logansport Broadcasting Corp. v. United States, 210 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
Logansport concerned a Federal Communications Commission system for allocating television
frequencies nationwide. Petitioners argued that the Commission violated the notice requirements
of the APA when it failed to state, in its notice of proposed rulemaking, that it had decided to
assign, to the extent practicable, VHF channels to the larger cities. Id. at 28. The court upheld the
Commission's rulemaking procedure, stating:
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Administrative rulemaking procedures changed significantly dur-
ing the 1970s.41 Many administrative agencies, either through congres-
sional authorization or their own initiative, adopted rulemaking
procedures that went beyond the APA's minimum requirements.42 Al-
though several administrative agencies still adhere to the notice re-
quirements prescribed in the APA,43 many agencies follow more
stringent notice provisions. One of the most common provisions in re-
cent statutes and agency guidelines requires the agency to develop and
[Section 4(a) of the APA] requires only that the prior notice include 'a description of the
subjects and issues involved.' We think the procedure followed by the Commission am-
ply fulfilled this requirement. ... Surely every time the Commission decided to take
account of some additional factor it was not required to start the proceedings all over
again. If such were the rule the proceeding might never be terminated.
Id; accord, Owensboro on the Air, Inc. v. United States, 262 F.2d 702 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert.
denied, 360 U.S. 911 (1959).
The judiciary's rather literal interpretation of the APA's notice requirements continued
through the 1960s. The court of appeals' decision in California Citizens Band Ass'n v. United
States, 375 F.2d 43 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 844 (1967), provides a good example of the
prevalent judicial position at that time. In Citizens Band the court upheld two Federal Communi-
cations Commission orders dealing with the promulgation of amendments to existing rules affect-
ing the Citizens Radio Service. 375 F.2d at 45. The Commission initiated the rulemaking
proceeding by publishing the contested amendments in proposed form, 27 Fed. Reg. 11,500
(1962), and stating that the proposed amendments were designed to clarify the permissible and
prohibited communications and uses of citizens radio stations. 375 F.2d at 45. After the comment
period, the Commission released final amendments that included some additional language not
present in the proposed amendments. This language, contained in the "basis and purpose" clause
of the amended rule, clarified the rules' purpose: to impose additional limitations on the use of
citizens radio stations. Id. at 48-49. Petitioners argued that they were not given adequate notice
because the proposed amendments did not contain this additional language. Id. at 47-48. The
court rejected this argument, holding that the additional language satisfied the APA's notice re-
quirement because the language concerned the issue of limitations on the use of citizens radio
stations, an issue identified in the proposed amendments as one of the subjects and issues involved
in the rulemaking proceedings. Id. at 49. The court reasoned that section 553(b)(3) "does not
require an agency to publish in advance every precise proposal which it may ultimately adopt as a
rule." Id. at 48; see 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3) (1976). The Citizens Band court, like earlier courts, went
no further than to require the agency to apprise affected parties of the subjects and issues involved
in the rulemaking proceeding.
41. Professor Davis aptly described these changes as so broad and so deep that they are
properly called revolutionary. 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 29, § 6:1, at 449.
42. These changes in the character of informal rulemaking are too extensive to review in this
comment. For summaries and analyses of the developments in administrative rulemaking during
the 1970s, see Fuchs, Development and Diversification in Administrative Rule Making, 72 Nw. U. L.
REv. 83 (1977); Hamilton, Proceduresfor the Adoption of Rules of GeneralAppiicability: The Need
for Procedural Innovation in Administrative Rulemaking, 60 CAL. L. REV. 1276, 1313-30 (1972);
Kestenbaum, Ruiemaking BeyondAPA: CrIteriafor Trial-Type Procedures and the FTC Improve-
ment Act, 44 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 679, 685-90 (1976); Williams, "HybridRulemaking" Under the
Administrative Procedure Act: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 42 U. CHi. L. REv. 401 (1975).
43. See, e.g., Federal Aviation Administration Procedural Rules, 14 C.F.R. § 11.29 (1980);
Federal Maritime Commission Rules of Practice and Procedure, 46 C.F.R. § 502.52 (1979); Fed-
eral Communications Commission Practice and Procedure, 47 C.F.R. § 1.413 (1979); Office of the
Secretary of Transportation Rulemaking Procedures, 49 C.F.R. § 5.23 (1980).
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publish proposed rules in its initial notice of rulemaking.44 Under this
provision, the agency can no longer publish a notice of rulemaking that
merely describes the subjects and issues involved in the rulemaking
proceeding, even though such a publication would constitute adequate
notice under the APA.45
Other recently enacted statutes contain notice provisions that re-
quire more than the initial publication of proposed rules.46 In the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, 47 for example, Congress not only
required the Environmental Protection Agency to publish proposed
rules, but also required that the agency's notice of rulemaking include a
summary of "(A) the factual data on which the proposed rule is based;
(B) the methodology used in obtaining the data and in analyzing the
data; and (C) the major legal interpretation and policy considerations
underlying the proposed rule." 48 Provisions like this one reduce an
agency's discretion to determine the content of its rulemaking notice49
because they require the agency to include specific items in that notice;
the agency is not allowed simply to describe the subjects and issues
involved in the rulemaking proceeding.
44. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7191(b)(1) (Supp. III 1979). This section, which prescribes the De-
partment of Energy's procedures for issuing rules, regulations, and orders, provides in part:
"[N]otice of any proposed rule, regulation, or order described in... this section shall be given by
publication of such proposed rule, regulation, or order in the Federal Register." Id. See also 29
U.S.C. § 655(b)(2) (1976); 30 U.S.C. § 81 1(e) (1976); Rules of Procedure for Promulgating, Modi-
fying or Revoking Occupational Safety or Health Standards, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1911.10-.11 (1980).
45. See notes 9-17 supra and accompanying text.
46. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7191(b)(1) (Supp. III 1979). This section requires the Department
of Energy's notice of a proposed rule to "be accompanied by a statement of the research, analysis,
and other available information in support of, the need for, and the probable effect of, any such
proposed rule, regulation or order." Id. See also 15 U.S.C. § 2056(G) (Supp. III 1979); 15 U.S.C.
§ 57a(G) (1976) (notice of proposed rulemaking must state with particularity the reason for the
proposed rule).
47. Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(3) (Supp. 11 1978). This section also provides that the published
notice should
set forth or summarize and provide a reference to any pertinent findings, recommenda-
tions and comments by the Scientific Review Committee... and the National Academy
of Sciences, and, if the proposal differs in any important respect from any of these rec-
ommendations, an explanation for such differences. All data, information, and docu-
ments referred to in this paragraph on which the proposed rule relies shall be included in
the docket on the date of publication of the proposed rule.
Id.
This expanded notice requirement was a response to judicial decisions that had questioned
the adequacy of informal rulemaking procedures under the Clean Air Act. H.R. REP. No. 294,
95th Cong., Ist Sess. 318-19, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1397-98; see Texas
v. EPA, 499 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1974); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir.
1972). Both decisions noted the sparse rulemaking record that the agency had compiled and its
detrimental effect on the court's ability to comprehend the substance of the issues and to conduct a
meaningful review. 499 F.2d at 321-22 (Clark, J., concurring specially); 462 F.2d at 850.
49. See text accompanying notes 38-40 supra.
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The development of these more stringent notice provisions indi-
cates an effort by Congress and the agencies to improve the quality of
public participation in the rulemaking process.50 The goals of notice
and comment are advanced when interested parties receive a more
complete summary of the important data, methodology, and proposals
on which to offer comments, criticisms, and alternative views before
final rules are adopted. In addition, stricter notice requirements pro-
vide interested parties with more information about the probable scope
and substance of the final rule or regulation. 51
Following the lead of Congress and the agencies, some courts have
imposed notice requirements that are stricter than the requirements
prescribed in the APA. Although section 553 does not explicitly re-
quire notice of the facts, information, and data that an agency consid-
ers when promulgating substantive rules,52 some courts have
nevertheless required that agencies give interested parties an opportu-
nity to respond to significant data relied on by the agency in formulat-
ing its rules.5 3
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit estab-
lished the basis for this stricter notice requirement in Portland Cement
Association v. Ruckelshaus.5 4 In Portland Cement the court reviewed
the procedures that the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency followed when promulgating air pollution standards for new or
modified cement plants.5 5 The agency published proposed rules, but
did not make available the disputed test results and methodology that
50. In order to improve public participation in rulemaking, Congress has passed several stat-
utes that add to the APA's informal rulemaking procedures. See, e.g., The Toxic Substances
Control Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1976); The Federal Trade Commission Improve-
ment Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (19-) (codified in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.); The Department of Energy Organization Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-91, 91 Stat. 565
(1977) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). These statutes all permit oral presentations or
public hearings, 15 U.S.C. § 2603(b)(5) (1976); 15 U.S.C. § 57a(b) (1976); 42 U.S.C. § 7191(c)
(Supp. 11 1978), and each requires a statement of findings or reasons either supporting the final
rule or responding to major comments, criticisms, and alternatives offered during the comment
period. 15 U.S.C. § 2603(b)(5) (1976); 15 U.S.C. § 57a(d)(l) (1976); 42 U.S.C. § 7191(d) (Supp. II
1978). For a general discussion of the provisions of these and other similar statutes, see I K.
DAVIS, supra note 29, § 6:9, at 482-88. See also Verkuil, The Emerging Concept ofAdinistrative
Procedure, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 258, 317-20 (1978) (discussing the developing concept in adminis-
trative law of "hybrid" rulemaking procedures that incorporate aspects both of notice and com-
ment and of formal public hearing procedures).
51. See text accompanying note 30 supra.
52. Section 553(b)(3) requires only a general notice of proposed rulemaking, 5 U.S.C.
§ 553(b)(3) (1976). See note 10 supra. See also Auerbach, supra note 11, at 21-23.
53. See generally 1 K. DAVIs, supra note 29, § 6:26, at 578-83.
54. 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974).
55. 486 F.2d at 377-79. The emission standards were promulgated pursuant to section 111 of
the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 741 1(b)(1) (Supp. 11 1978).
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formed a partial basis for the final standards until after the final stan-
dards were promulgated. 56 The court remanded the case so that the
agency could receive and consider comments on the tests supporting
the regulations.5 7 The court reasoned that it contravened "the purpose
of a rule-making proceeding to promulgate rules on the basis of inade-
quate data, or on data that, [in] critical degree, is known only to the
agency."'58 The critical data supporting an agency's rule are important
to interested parties because any inaccuracy in those data undermines
the rational basis for the rule. Failure to give notice of this data before
the promulgation of final rules violates the purpose of the APA's notice
provision because it fails to give interested parties prior notice of an
important issue in the rulemaking proceeding and precludes public
comment on the adequacy of the data.59
The notice principle set forth in Portland Cement has not been in-
terpreted to require agencies to publish every piece of data that they
consider when formulating a final rule.60 It does, however, support the
proposition that significant data an agency uses when developing its
proposed and final rules should be exposed to public comment before
their final adoption.6' In keeping with this principle, courts following
Portland Cement have invalidated agency regulations for failing to pro-
vide adequate notice when an agency failed to disclose scientific data
56. 486 F.2d at 392. The final standards were adopted in December 1971 but the details of
the two testing programs in question, aside from a summary of the test results, were not made
available to petitioners until April 1972.
57. Id. at 393, 402.
58. Id. at 393.
59. The Portland Cement court also noted that knowledge of the basis upon which the rule is
proposed is a prerequisite to being able to make meaningful comment. Id. at 393 n.67. This
observation highlights the relationship between the notice requirement and the opportunity for
public comment provided in 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c) (1976). The quality of the agency's initial no-
tice of proposed rulemaking determines, in large part, the quality of public comment.
60. See BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. Costle, 598 F.2d 637 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1096 (1980); B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Department of Transp., 541 F.2d 1178, 1184 (6th Cir. 1976)
("The APA does not require that every bit of background information used by an administrative
agency be published for public comment"), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 930 (1977); cf. Appalachian
Power Co. v. EPA, 579 F.2d 846, 852-54 (4th Cir. 1978) (constitutional requirements are satisfied
if the agency, by information made available reasonably in advance of public hearings, sufficiently
apprises parties of the nature and basis of the regulation or rule so that they can comment intelli-
gently).
61. See WNCN Listeners Guild v. FCC, 610 F.2d 838, 858 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Bazelon, J.,
concurring), cert. granted, 445 U.S. 914 (1980) (No. 79-824); National Crushed Stone Ass'n v.
EPA, 601 F.2d 111, 119 (4th Cir. 1979); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1030 (D.C.
Cir. 1978); Shell Oil Co. v. FEA, 574 F.2d 512, 516 n.8 (remp. Emer. Ct. App. 1978); United
States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240,251 (2d Cir. 1977); Wright, supra note 31,
at 383 n.34.
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supporting the rule;62 when an agency relied on an undisclosed staff
study in formulating its final rule;63 and when an agency failed to make
available for public comment data compiled by the agency's contractor
that were used to revise a proposed rule.64 In these cases the courts
reasoned that the failure to disclose important data before the promul-
gation of a final rule suppresses meaningful comment65 and therefore
diminishes the assurance that the agency's decision is substantively ac-
curate.6 6 In addition, one court noted that a failure to disclose signifi-
cant data raises questions of procedural fairness because it precludes
affected parties from commenting on the rule's substantive basis.67
The Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Vermont Yankee Nu-
clear Power Corp. v. Nuclear Resources Defense Council"6 raises ques-
tions concerning a court's authority to prescribe these stricter notice
requirements. In Vermont Yankee the Court held that the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit had erred in overturning
an Atomic Energy Commission rule.69 The court of appeals had held
that the rule had been promulgated pursuant to inadequate rulemaking
procedures, despite the fact that the Commission employed more than
the minimum procedures required by section 553.70 The Supreme
Court, in broad dicta, cautioned reviewing courts against engrafting
their own notions of proper procedures upon agencies, stating that
"courts are generally not free to impose [additional procedural rights] if
the agencies have not chosen to grant them."'71 This language, how-
ever, does not prevent a court from imposing additional notice and
comment procedures when an agency's rulemaking procedures fail to
62. See United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977). The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, when invalidating agency regulations, concluded: "To
suppress meaningful comment by failure to disclose the basic data relied upon is akin to rejecting
comment altogether." Id. at 252.
63. See WNCN Listeners Guild v. FCC, 610 F.2d 838 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 445
U.S. 914 (1980) (No. 79-824).
64. See National Crushed Stone Ass'n v. EPA, 601 F.2d 111 (4th Cir. 1979) (remanding
regulations to the EPA for reconsideration).
65. See United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 252 (2d Cir. 1977).
66. See WNCN Listeners Guild v. FCC, 610 F.2d 838, 846 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. granted,
445 U.S. 914 (1980) (No. 79-824). See also text accompanying note 35 supra.
67. See WNCN Listeners Guild v. FCC, 610 F.2d 838, 846 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. granted,
445 U.S. 914 (1980) (No. 79-824).
68. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
69. Id. at 535. The rule in question dealt with the environmental effects associated with the
uranium fuel cycle in light-water nuclear power reactors. During the rulemaking proceeding the
Atomic Energy Commission allowed both written and oral statements to be received and incorpo-
rated into the rulemaking record, but declined to use the full adjudicatory procedures contained in
5 U.S.C. § 554 (1976). 435 U.S. at 529.
70. 435 U.S. at 535. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976).
71. 435 U.S. at 524.
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satisfy the APA's minimum requirements. 72 Because the agencies in
Portland Cement and its progeny failed to satisfy the APA's minimum
requirements, Vermont Yankee does not necessarily invalidate the
stricter notice requirements imposed in these cases. 73 Indeed, the judi-
ciary's willingness in these cases to put more bite into the APA's notice
provision indicates a legitimate effort to fulfill the expressed purposes74
of the APA's notice and comment procedures. Courts should make a
similar effort when reviewing final rules that differ substantially from
proposed or interim rules.
Ill. SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE BETWEEN PROPOSED OR INTERIM RULES
AND FINAL RULES: SUFFICIENCY OF NOTICE
A. BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. Costle.
When an agency publishes proposed or interim rules for comment
by interested parties, the agency is expected to take the comments into
consideration when formulating the final rules. If the final rules are
changed substantially from the proposed or interim rules, however, the
question arises whether the agency has provided the required notice
and opportunity to comment on the rules as finally adopted. The Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit recently confronted this question in
BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. Costle.75 Wyandotte involved final Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations governing the discharge
of pollutants by the pesticide industry. After a study of the industry by
two outside contractors, the EPA published interim regulations that
were immediately effective. 76 The EPA subsequently invited public
72. Since the APA prescribes the minimum procedural requirements that agencies must fol-
low when promulgating substantive rules, see note 11 supra and accompanying text, an agency's
failure to meet the requirements permits a court to set aside the agency's rule. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(D) (1976). This section provides: "The reviewing court shall-.. . (2) hold unlawful
and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be-... (D) without observance
of procedure required by law .... " Id.
73. See notes 54-67 supra and accompanying text. The Portland Cement court, in addition to
determining that the Environmental Protection Agency failed to provide adequate notice of im-
portant data underlying its rule, also required the EPA, on remand, to respond explicitly to peti-
tioner's comments by explaining why they were or were not material. 486 F.2d at 394. The
validity of this aspect of the court's holding may be subject to question in light of Vermont Yan-
kee. For an analysis of the Court's opinion in Vermont Yankee and its possible impact on admin-
istrative rulemaking, see K. DAVIS, supra note 29, at §§ 6:35-:37, at 605-16 (2d ed. 1978); Byse,
Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of Administrative Procedure: A Somewhat Dierent View, 91
HARV. L. REv. 1823 (1978); Nathanson, The Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Opinion: A Master-
piece ofStatutory Misinterpretation, 16 SAN DInGo L. REv. 183 (1979); Stewart, Vermont Yankee
and the Evolution of Administrative Procedure, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1805 (1978).
74. See notes 26-32 supra and accompanying text.
75. 598 F.2d 637 (lst Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1096 (1980).
76. 41 Fed. Reg. 48,087 (1976).
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comment on these rules. These interim regulations established signifi-
cantly different effluent limitations for three separate subcategories of
facilities producing organic pesticides.77 The final regulations, pub-
lished seventeen and a half months after the interim regulations,78
eliminated the separate subcategories and established uniform limita-
tions for all organic pesticides.79 The industry contended that the efflu-
ent limitations in the final rule were so different from those in the
interim regulations that the interim regulations did not provide ade-
quate notice of the terms or substance of the final regulations.80
Initially, the court noted that it must strictly review an agency's
compliance with procedural requirements because these requirements
justify the court's assumption that the substantive decisions made by
agencies "are in fact the product of informed, expert reasoning tested
by exposure to diverse public comment."'' l The court rejected the peti-
tioners' claims, however, even though the petitioners were not aware of
the substantial changes until the final rule was promulgated,8 2 and even
though the EPA's final rule established a single effluent subcategory for
organic pesticides despite the industry's preference for increasing the
number of subcategories.8 3 "The essential inquiry," stated the court,
"is whether the commentators have had a fair opportunity to present
their views on the contents of the final [regulations]." 8 4 Because the
industry's comments would have been the same even if the proposed
regulations had reflected the changes incorporated into the final rule,85
the petitioners "had a fair opportunity to present their views"86 and
therefore were not entitled to an additional period in which to com-
ment on the final regulations.8 7
77. Id. The EPA did not publish the regulations in proposed form. Citing an order of the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia, the agency determined that publication
of proposed regulations was not practicable and therefore published immediately effective interim
final regulations. Id. 48,088.
78. The interim regulations were published on November 1, 1976, but the final regulations
were not published until April 25, 1978. Brief for Petitioner at 3-4, Eli Lilly & Co. v. Costle, 100 S.
Ct. 1063 (1980).
79. 40 C.F.R. § 455.22 (1980).
8G. 598 F.2d at 641; see Brief for Petitioner, supra note 78, at 5.
81. 598 F.2d at 641.
82. Id. at 642.
83. Id. at 643.
84. Id. at 642.
85. Id. at 644. The court presumed that although petitioners would have had a different
proposition against which to argue, their proposed solution would have been the same for the
same reasons. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Wyandotte.88 Justice
Rehnquist, however, dissented from the denial of certiorari, noting that
the case presented
an issue of great importance, which cannot help but become greater
as time goes on and more and more administrative proceedings are
conducted either directly under the Administrative Procedure Act
... or similar provisions in new Acts of Congress for review of
agency action. That question is the degree to which an agency,
which publishes a rule for notice and comment under § 4 of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act and very substantially changes the rule in
response to the comments it receives, is obliged to publish the revised
rule to allow another opportunity for notice and comment ...
. . . [W]hen we consider the very significant effects that a
"rulemaking" procedure may have upon the parties involved . . I
think this Court should grant certiorari to examine the question.89
The result in Wyandotte illustrates the possible adverse effects of
substantial rule changes on parties subject to the final rule and on the
courts. First, when a proposed or interim rule and submitted com-
ments leave affected parties without notice of the final rule's substantial
changes until publication of the final rule, these parties are forced to
make immediate and often significant adjustments in order to comply
with the final rule's provisions.90 Second, lack of notice of substantial
changes in a final rule undermines the opportunity afforded interested
parties to comment on all important aspects of a rule before it is finally
adopted.91 Third, substantial differences between a proposed or in-
terim rule and a final rule make it difficult for a court to judge the
substantive merit of the final rule because the court cannot rely on the
usual assumption that the final rule is the result of careful reasoning
based on public scrutiny.92
Wyandotte also illustrates the important distinction between pro-
posed and interim rules. Affected parties are not required to comply
with proposed rules. Interim rules, however, are immediately effective;
a substantial change in interim rules, therefore, dramatically increases
the impact of such a change on affected parties.93 Congress and the
88. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Costle, 444 U.S. 1096 (1980).
89. Id. at 1063-64 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
90. See text accompanying note 150 infra.
91. This undermining follows because an agency's notice of rulemaking, whether in the form
of interim or proposed rules, dictates the subjects and issues for public comment. See note 33
supra and accompanying text. An inadequate notice of the final rule's substantially revised provi-
sions, therefore, precludes comment relating to these provisions.
92. See text accompanying notes 35, 81 supra.
93. See notes 146-50 infra and accompanying text.
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courts, however, have ignored this distinction.94 Although courts
strictly review final rules that differ substantially from proposed or in-
terim rules to ensure that the purposes of notice and comment rulemak-
ing are satisfied, the more significant impact of a substantial change in
interim rules merits the imposition of even greater procedural safe-
guards.
B. Congressional Consideration of an Additional Period of Comment
for Substantially Revised Final Rules.
In 1976 Congress considered a series of bills to amend the APA's
rulemaking requirements. 95 Two of these bills prohibited an agency
from adopting a final rule substantially different from the proposed
rule unless the agency apprised interested parties of the potential differ-
ences between the two rules.96 Further, the agency was required to give
these parties an opportunity to respond to these differences during the
public comment period or, alternatively, to give official notice of the
revised rule and permit an additional period of public comment.97
These bills referred solely to proposed rules without any provision for
94. The Wyandotte court, for example, based its decision on the reasoning developed in
South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646 (Ist Cir. 1974), a decision that involved substantial
change in a proposed, rather than an interim, rule. See text accompanying notes 117-30 infra. In
addition, congressional bills that have contained proposals for an additional notice and comment
period whenever an agency publishes a substantially revised final rule have considered only the
proposed-rules context, without specifically discussing interim rules. See text accompanying note
98 infra.
95. Fourteen separate bills seeking to amend the APA were considered during the 94th Con-
gress. See Administrative Procedure Act Amendments of 1976. Hearings Before the Senate Sub-
comm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on 1976Amendments]. These bills were by no means
the first effort to amend the APA; the Act has frequently been the subject of congressional reform
bills. Despite the volume of proposed legislation, however, the rulemaking provisions of 5 U.S.C.
§ 553 (1976) remain essentially the same as those adopted in the original Act. For examples of
some of the legislative proposals concerning the APA, see H.R. 3263, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979),
reprinted in Hearings on HR. 3263 Before the SubcomnL on Administrative Law and Governmental
Relations of the House Comm on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); Administrative Proce-
dure Act Amendments of 1978: Hearings Before the Senate Subcomm. on Administrative Practice
and Procedures of the Comrz on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 505 (1978); Fisk, Legislation
andAdministrative Law, 17 AD. L. REv. 115 (1965); Landmarks Along the Way, 24 AD. L. REv.
412-564 (1973); Pending Proposals to Amendthe FederalAdministrative Procedure Act: An Analysis
of . 518, 20 AD. L. REv. 185 (1968).
96. S. 3297 & S. 3358, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), discussed in Hearings on 1976 Amend-
ments, supra note 95, at 126, 139. In addition to the requirement of an additional period of com-
ment on substantially revised rules, the bills also provided for congressional review of
administrative rules and regulations, extension of the comment period on proposed rules, a re-
quirement that agencies publish their rationales for accepting, rejecting, or accepting in modified
form the comments received from interested parties, and a new emergency rule provision. Id.
97. Id.
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interim rules.98
Parties subject to administrative regulation generally favored the
imposition of an additional notice and comment period proposed by
these bills.99 They argued that an additional opportunity to comment
on substantially revised final rules would be fair to both the public and
the agencies, because it would ensure "full consideration and disposi-
tion of the views of all interested parties, and a full opportunity to com-
ment on the approach ultimately chosen by an agency in a final
rule."100 Most of the agencies, on the other hand, sharply criticized the
additional notice and comment provisions. 01 They asserted that such
provisions would seriously delay the rulemaking process,102 and that
agencies might be less responsive to comments on proposed rules to
avoid the delay of another comment period.10 3 In addition, the agen-
cies noted that any party with a serious objection to a final rule differ-
ing substantially from the proposed rule could petition for the
amendment or repeal of the rule under section 553(e) of the APA.' 4
Although Congress never adopted this additional notice and com-
ment requirement for substantially revised final rules, 0 5 the confficting
positions taken by the agencies and the affected parties emphasize the
central issue in the judicial review of final rules that are substantially
changed from their proposed or interim form. In these situations,
courts should strictly review the agency's procedures to determine
whether the delay of an additional notice and comment period is justi-
98. See Hearings on 1976.4mendments, supra note 95, at 126, 139, 233, 349, 448.
99. Representatives of the American Health Association, American Medical Association, and
Administrative Conference of the United States were among those who testified in favor of an
additional period of comment. Hearings on 1976 4mendments, supra note 95, at 117-19, 123-26,
139-49, 233. A prepared statement submitted by the Air Transport Association of America also
supported the additional period of comment. Id. 553.
100. Id. 553.
101. Only the Interstate Commerce Commission supported the provision:
New section 553(d)(2) requires that if an agency desires to adopt a rule substantially
different from the proposed rule, it must republish the rule and receive comments on the
differences from the original proposal. This generally makes good sense since by such
notice an agency can ensure that it has considered all public views on the rule it finally
chooses to promulgate ...
We also should emphasize that limiting this requirement to rules "substantially"
different from those proposed is important since this allows the agency to avoid further
delays in the promulgation of a rule simply because of technical or editorial changes,
while requiring necessary republication where there are major differences from the origi-
nal proposal.
Id. 448 (comment of the Interstate Commerce Commission).
102. Id. 378 (comment of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board).
103. Id. 349 (comment of the Environmental Protection Agency).
104. Id. 502 (prepared statement of the Small Business Administration). Section 553(e) pro-
vides in full: "Each agency shall give an interested person the right to petition for the issuance,
amendment, or repeal of a rule." 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (1976).
105. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976).
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fled by the agency's failure to give interested persons an adequate op-
portunity to comment on the final rule's substantially revised
provisions and a sufficient chance to prepare for the effect of the final
rule or regulation.10 6
C. Judicial Review of Final Rules That D#,er Substantially From
Proposed or Interim Rules.
As Wyandotte demonstrates, courts will not automatically require
an additional notice and comment period whenever there is any sub-
stantial change between an agency's proposed or interim rule and the
final rule. 10 7 When the change is substantial, however, the reviewing
court must decide whether the proposed or interim rule has provided
adequate notice of the scope and substance of the final rule and, in
addition, whether interested parties have had a sufficient opportunity to
comment. When making this determination, courts have concentrated
primarily on two factors: the sufficiency of notice provided by the pro-
posed or interim rule, and the relationship between the comments re-
ceived and the substantial changes reflected in the final rule. 10 8 The
courts have used the same analysis for both proposed and interim
rules. 09
In upholding the EPA's substantially revised final regulations, the
Wyandotte court relied primarily on the judicial standards developed
in International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus "0 and South Terminal
Corp. v. EPA."'1 International Harvester involved a decision, made by
the Administrator of the EPA, to deny applications for one-year sus-
pensions of the emission standards for light-duty vehicles.," 2 The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the
106. This determination generally comports with the purposes behind the APA's notice re-
quirement. See notes 26-32 supra and accompanying text.
107. See also Taylor Diving & Salvage Co. v. Department of Labor, 599 F.2d 622, 626 (5th
Cir. 1979); BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. Costle, 598 F.2d 637, 643-45 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1096 (1980); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 48 (D.C. Cir.), cer. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976);
South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 659-60 (Ist Cir. 1974); International Harvester Co. v.
Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 631-32 (D.C. Cir. 1973); California Citizens Band Ass'n v. United
States, 375 F.2d 43, 48-50 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 844 (1967).
108. See notes 128-29 infra and accompanying text.
109. See note 94 supra and accompanying text.
110. 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
I11. 504 F.2d 646 (Ist Cir. 1974).
112. These standards were prescribed under section 202 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1857f-(b)(1)(A) (1970) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b)(1)(A) (Supp. 11 1978)). This
section provided that "engines manufactured during or after model year 1975 shall contain stan-
dards which require a reduction of at least 90 per centum from emissions of carbon monoxide and
hydrocarbons allowable under the standards... applicable to light duty vehicles and engines
manufactured in model year 1970."
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agency's denial even though the petitioners were precluded from com-
menting on the methodology that the EPA had used to determine that
sufficient technology existed to comply with the emission standards. 1 3
The court based this holding on the fact that the methodology in ques-
tion was developed in part on the basis of the petitioner's submissions
at prior hearings. 14 The court also stated, in dictum, that "[t]he re-
quirement of submission of a proposed rule for comment does not au-
tomatically generate a new opportunity for comment merely because
the rule promulgated by the agency differs from the rule it proposed,
partly at least in response to submissions."' "15 Thus, the court indicated
that whenever the changes in a rule between its proposed and final
stages are based in part on the comments received from interested par-
ties, the agency need not republish the rule for further comment." 6
This approach fails to consider whether the proposed rule initially gave
interested parties adequate notice of the subjects and issues covered in
the final rule. In the absence of such notice an agency might simply
rely on the comments of a few parties to support substantial changes in
the final rule that were not adequately indicated by the proposed rule.
South Terminal Corp. v. EPA117 more carefully considered
whether a proposed rule provided adequate notice to all interested par-
ties. The South Terminal court reviewed an air quality transportation
control plan that the EPA had promulgated for metropolitan Boston." 8
The agency initially published for notice and comment several pro-
posed measures designed to keep the level of airborne pollutants in the
Petitioners were attempting to defer compliance with this 90% reduction requirement until
1976 under section 202(b)(5)(D) of the Clean Air Act, which authorized the Administrator to
grant a one-year suspension if "the applicant has established that effective control technology,
processes, operating methods, or other alternatives are not available or have not been available for
a sufficient period of time to achieve compliance prior to the effective date of such standards." 42
U.S.C. § 1857f-l(b)(5)(D)(iii) (1970) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b)(5)(C)(iii) (Supp. II
1978)). See 478 F.2d at 622.
113. 478 F.2d at 632.
114. Id.
115. Id. The court further stated: "A contrary rule would lead to the absurdity that in rule-
making under the APA the agency can learn from the comments on its proposals only at the peril
of starting a new procedural round of commentary." Id. at 632 n.5 1.
116. See, e.g., BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. Costle, 598 F.2d 637, 643 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1096 (1980). In upholding an EPA regulation governing discharge of pollutants into
waterways the court of appeals stated: "[Though EPA's solution was not the one for which indus-
try argued, it was suggested by and, in part, a logical outgrowth of industry's comments." 598
F.2d at 643.
117. 504 F.2d 646 (Ist Cir. 1974).
118. The plan was promulgated under a section of the Clean Air Act that permits the Admin-
istrator to propose a plan of his own if a state fails to submit a plan meeting the Act's require-
ments. See 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(c) (1970) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c)(1) (Supp. II
1978)).
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Boston area within national standards." 9 In addition, the agency's
published notice warned affected parties that
[t]he Administrator's final promulgation of transportation controls
* . .will be influenced by the comments and testimony he receives
.... These influences, and the additional analysis of alternative
strategies that can be made in the time between this proposal and
final promulgation, may lead the Administrator to adopt final regula-
tions that differ in important ways from this proposal.120
The final regulations differed substantially from the initial propos-
als: the EPA deleted several of the provisions originally specified in its
notice of rulemaking and added several new provisions. 12 The pro-
posed plan, for example, included several specific measures designed to
reduce available parking in the Boston area.' 22 In contrast, the final
plan relied on measures for facilitating car pooling and vehicle inspec-
tion, as well as a freeze on (but not a reduction of) existing parking
spaces. 123 The petitioners charged that this final plan differed so radi-
cally from the one proposed that they had no meaningful forewarning
of its substance. 24 The court rejected this contention. Although the
final plan differed significantly from the proposed plan, the final plan
did restrict parking. 25 Moreover, some of the comments the agency
received prior to promulgating the final plan related to measures finally
adopted.' 26 The court held, therefore, that the proposed plan satisfied
the APA's notice provision: "Although the changes were substantial,
they were in character with the original scheme and were additionally
foreshadowed in proposals and comments advanced during the
rulemaking. [In addition, the parties] had been warned that strategies
might be modified in light of their suggestions."' 27
The South [Terminal court, unlike the International Harvester
court, identified two factors of primary importance in determining
119. 504 F.2d at 657. The Administrator's proposed alternatives included a ban against on-
street parking in metropolitan Boston during certain parts of the day, a five-dollar surcharge on
off-street parking in downtown Boston and at Logan Airport, and a sticker system to regulate
travel on Boston's major expressway. Id. at 656-57.
120. 38 Fed. Reg. 17,694 (1973).
121. 504 F.2d at 657-58. The Administrator's final plan is set forth in 38 Fed. Reg. 30,964-65
(1973).
122. 504 F.2d at 656-57.
123. Id. at 657-58.
124. Id. at 656.
125. This rule is in direct contrast to the proposed rule in Wagner, which contained no refer-
ence whatsoever to a change in the performance criteria of automobile flashers and therefore left
affected parties without prior notice of the change in those criteria. See text accompanying notes
131-36 infra.
126. 504 F.2d 658-59.
127. Id. at 658.
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whether a substantially revised final rule is promulgated in accordance
with the APA: the relationship of the changes to the original rulemak-
ing proposal 28 and the nexus between the substantial changes and the
comments received. 2 9 Under this approach, a substantial change must
relate in part to the comments received and a proposed rule must fairly
apprise interested parties of the scope and substance of a substantially
revised final rule. 30
Wagner Electric Corp. v. Vole,'3' a case decided before South Ter-
minal, provides an excellent example of the interrelationship between
these two factors. In Wagner the Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit reviewed a National Highway Traffic Safety Administration order
governing the performance of turn signal and hazard warning flashers.
The agency had initially published a proposed order eliminating the
permissible failure rates for flashers, but that order contained no refer-
ence to a change in the performance criteria of the flashers. 132 The
final order, however, substantially downgraded these performance cri-
teria.133 The agency contended that this change was valid because no-
tice of its intention to eliminate permissible failure rates gave interested
parties a sufficient opportunity to comment on the entire subject matter
of the final standard. 34 In addition, the agency noted that certain com-
ments from flasher manufacturers did discuss the desirability of down-
128. See, e.g., Taylor Diving & Salvage Co. v. Department of Labor, 599 F.2d 622, 626 (5th
Cir. 1979) (the contested provision in the standard finally promulgated was a logical outgrowth of
provisions found in the standard originally proposed).
129. This factor follows from the dictum in International Harvester, which indicates that
changes based in part on submitted comments are valid. See text accompanying note 115 supra.
The South Terminal court also placed some importance on the EPA's notice of rulemaking
because it stated that the proposed plan might be modified in light of submitted comments. See
text accompanying note 120 supra. This statement alone, however, does not justify upholding
substantially revised final rules in the absence of adequate notice. Because the notice requirement
in 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3) (1976) was designed to fairly apprise interested parties of significant issues
involved in the rulemaking, see notes 26-27 supra and accompanying text, knowledge that the
agency was considering alternatives or changes in their proposed rule would not, in itself, give
interested parties notice of final alternatives or changes that were not indicated by the proposed
rule.
130. See, e.g., American Standard, Inc. v. United States, 602 F.2d 256, 268 (Ct. Cl. 1979)
(treasury regulations were invalidated because the initial proposal did not give the public fair
notice of the agency's intent with respect to the regulations' final form).
131. 466 F.2d 1013 (3d Cir. 1972).
132. 49 C.F.R. § 571.108 (1980). This proposed order was actually the agency's second pub-
lished notice of rulemaking. The order promulgated pursuant to the first notice had been with-
drawn on Wagner's request because it included a provision for omitting sampling procedures that
the first notice did not mention or indicate. 466 F.2d at 1016. The notice in question was then
issued to include a proposal to omit the sampling procedures. Id. at 1017.
133. 466 F.2d at 1018.
134. Id. at 1019.
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grading flasher performance criteria. 135 The court, without specifically
discussing the factors later identified in South Terminal, rejected this
contention, concluding that the agency's proposed standard provided
inadequate notice of its final standard because it failed to apprise all
interested parties of the issue of performance criteria. 136
The most significant aspect of Wagner is that the court remanded
the substantially revised final standard for additional notice and com-
ment, expressly refusing to sustain it even though the revisions related
in part to comments received from interested parties on the desirability
of downgrading the flasher performance criteria. 137 Under this ap-
proach, an agency cannot remedy a defective notice simply by pointing
to some comments in the record that relate to the changes incorporated
in the final rule. 138 Together, Wagner and South Terminal 3 9 suggest
that for the courts to uphold a substantially changed final rule, they
must be satisfied that the changes are sufficiently related to both the
proposed rule and the submitted comments.
A strict application of the two factors recognized in South Termi-
nal can provide affected parties with adequate protection when a final
rule is changed substantially from its proposed form. By requiring that
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1020-21. The court also drew support for this conclusion from the failure of certain
state agencies and consumer groups, which were vitally affected by the final standard, to offer any
comments relating to performance criteria. The court viewed this absence of comment as evi-
dence that the notice did not apprise interested parties of the subject and issue involved. Id. at
1019-20.
137. When refusing to sustain the final standard the court stated: "The fact that some knowl-
edgeable manufacturers appreciated the intimate relationship between the permissible failure rate
provisions and the performance criteria, and so responded, is not relevant. Others possibly not so
knowledgeable also were interested persons within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 553." 466 F.2d at
1019.
The court also placed little importance on the warning, included in the notice of proposed
rulemaking, that "[t]he agency does not. . . accept the proposition that every change in detail
made from a notice of proposed rule making must be resubmitted as a proposal before a final rule
may be issued." Id. at 1017. Like the warning in South Terminal, see text accompanying note 120
supra, this statement could not, in itself, remedy a defective notice.
138. See text accompanying note 116 supra. Conversely, some courts have held that interested
parties cannot complain of the lack of opportunity to offer meaningful comment if the agency's
preliminary rules gave sufficient notice of the substance and scope of the final rule. See Associa-
tion of Am. R.Rs. v. Adams, 485 F. Supp. 1077, 1084-85 (D.D.C. 1978). In Adams the court
rejected the petitioner's claim that a party who agreed with the agency's initial proposal has a right
to refrain from commenting thereon and then to insist that the proposed rule not be changed to his
detriment. See also American Frozen Food Inst. v. Train, 539 F.2d 107, 134 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(final EPA regulations were procedurally valid because the proposed regulation fully informed
petitioners of the terms that might be imposed); National Indus. Traffic League v. United States,
396 F. Supp. 456, 460 (D.D.C. 1975) (final agency requirements were held to be well within the
agency's notice of proposed action).
139. See text accompanying notes 128-38 supra.
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substantial changes be sufficiently related to both the proposed rule and
the submitted comments, a reviewing court ensures that the agency's
procedures satisfy the two purposes of notice and comment rulemak-
ing.140 First, the court's determination that the proposed rule suffi-
ciently apprises interested parties of the subject matter and scope of the
final rules ensures that those parties had adequate prior notice of the
nature and effect of the pertinent rules. 4 1 Second, the court's finding
that the substantial changes incorporated in the final rule relate to the
comments received from interested parties ensures that the agency has
responded to those parties' views and therefore has afforded them a
meaningful opportunity to participate in the rulemaking process.142
The First Circuit's decision in Wyandotte illustrates the problems
that can result when a court fails to apply these factors strictly. The
Wyandotte court concluded that the EPA's substantial rule changes
were sufficiently related to the interim regulations and the submitted
comments even though the petitioners were not aware of the changes
until publication of the final regulations. 143 Further, the court found
the changes were precisely the opposite of those the petitioners advo-
cated in their comments.144 This broad application of South Terminal
subjected affected manufacturers to substantially revised standards that
were not foreshadowed by either the interim regulations or the com-
ments advanced during the rulemaking process. Interested parties did
not receive effective notice of the final rules and had no real opportu-
nity to comment on the rules finally adopted. The court could have
remedied these problems by ordering the EPA to impose an additional
period of notice and comment.
IV. SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE BETWEEN INTERIM AND FINAL RULES:
THE NEED FOR AN ADDITIONAL NOTICE
AND COMMENT PERIOD
The Wyandotte decision is troublesome for another reason: the
court's holding had an even more adverse impact on the parties be-
140. See notes 26-32 supra and accompanying text.
141. See text accompanying note 31 supra. When determining whether the proposed rule has
provided adequate notice of the final rule's scope and substance, the lack of public comments will
often be an important factor. See Wagner Elec. Corp. v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1013, 1019-20 (3d Cir.
1972) (failure of certain vitally affected groups to offer comments relating to a significant change
incorporated in the final rule indicated that the proposed rule did not afford them adequate no-
tice); National Resources Defense Council v. SEC, 389 F. Supp. 689, 700 n.9 (D.D.C. 1974) (small
response to proposed rules indicated inadequate notice of their importance).
142. See text accompanying note 32 supra.
143. See text accompanying note 82 supra.
144. See text accompanying note 83 supra.
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cause the agency initially published interim, rather than proposed, reg-
ulations. 145 Interim rules, unlike proposed rules, take effect
immediately upon publication and carry the force of law. 46 The im-
pact of an interim rule is, therefore, much greater than that of a pro-
posed rule; affected parties are required to comply with the interim
rule's provisions even though they have had little or no opportunity to
comment on the interim provisions.147
This greater impact is exacerbated by the usually long delay be-
tween the time the agency publishes an interim rule and the time it
adopts a final rule.148 Because of this delay, an interim rule remains in
effect for a substantial period of time, forcing affected parties to de-
velop means to comply with the interim rule's provisions. When an
agency thereafter promulgates a final rule that differs substantially
from its interim rule, it frustrates affected parties' reliance on the in-
terim rule and forces them to readjust to vastly different standards and
provisions. In Wyandotte the interim regulations had been in effect for
over seventeen months before the agency promulgated its substantially
revised final regulations.149 Affected parties were therefore subjected to
completely different effluent limitations after having been required to
comply with the interim regulations for almost one and a half years;
further, they were without effective notice of the changes until publica-
tion of the final regulations. 150
145. 598 F.2d at 640.
146. The interim rule is put into effect immediately, usually because of unavoidable limita-
tions of time or the urgency of the conditions the rule is designed to correct. House REPORT,
supra note 11, at 25.26, reprinted in APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 2, at 259-60; see
United States Steel Corp. v. EPA, 605 F.2d 283, 285 (7th Cir. 1979) (promulgation of interim air
quality standards within a short period after the passage of the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1977 was necessitated by Congress's tight statutory deadline), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1035 (1980);
Nader v. Sawhill, 514 F.2d 1064 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1975) (the Cost of Living Council
promulgated an immediate one dollar per barrel increase in the maximum ceiling price of "old"
oil because of the urgent need to reduce the large discrepancy between domestic crude and world
crude prices); Reeves v. Simow, 507 F.2d 455 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1974) (gasoline regulations
were made immediately effective because the long lines and violence resulting from a gas shortage
required prompt action).
147. See text accompanying notes 18-25 supra.
148. See Consolidated Coal Co. v. Costle, 604 F.2d 239, 246 (4th Cir. 1979) (18-month and I I-
month delays between promulgation of EPA interim and final regulations); National Crushed
Stone Ass'n v. EPA, 601 F.2d 111, 112 (4th Cir. 1979) (13-month delay between promulgation of
interim and final rules); BASF Wyandotte v. Costle, 598 F.2d 637 (1st Cir. 1979) (17 l/2-month
delay), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1096 (1980). Congress has considered several bills that would have
alleviated this problem by replacing the APA's good-cause exceptions with a provision allowing
interim or emergency rules to remain in effect for no more than six or seven months. See Hearings
on 1976 Amendments, supra note 95, at 487; S. 1070, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1003(d) (1959), re-
printed in 24 AD. L. REv. 412, 420-21 (1972).
149. 598 F.2d at 640-41.
150. Id. at 642.
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Imposition of an additional period of notice and comment in Wy-
andotte would have significantly benefitted those subject to the final
regulations. By deferring the effective date of the final rule, an addi-
tional comment period would have given affected parties an opportu-
nity to point out flaws or problems in the substantial revisions before
those revisions became effective. An additional period also would have
given affected parties time to prepare for the impact of the final regula-
tions and to take any action that the issuance of the final regulations
might have prompted.151 Most important, the comments received dur-
ing this period would have given the Wyandotte court a more complete
record on which to review the substantive validity of the revisions.'5 2
In upholding the agency's procedures, the Wyandotte court based
its conclusion partly on a determination that the comments received
would not have differed fundamentally even if the commentators had
known what changes the agency would ultimately incorporate in the
final regulations. 53 If the court had imposed an additional notice and
comment period, however, it would not have had to make this determi-
nation; instead, comments on the substantial changes would have been
in the record and available for the court to review. The court could
have actually determined whether these comments differed fundamen-
tally from the comments on the interim regulations and whether there
was any merit to the comments.
Imposing an additional notice and comment period in cases in
which interim rules are substantially revised would have no apprecia-
ble effect on the efficiency of the administrative rulemaking process.
An additional notice and comment period would not delay the promul-
gation of effective rules because interim rules would already be in
force. Imposing the additional notice and comment period on substan-
151. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 15, reprinted in APA LEGISLATIVE HIsToRY, supra
note 2, at 201. The purpose of the requirement that agencies publish substantive rules at least
thirty days before the rule's effective date is to provide an opportunity for parties to prepare for
the impact of the rule. 5 U.S.C. § 553(d) (1976). In the case of interim rules, however, affected
parties are deprived of this preparatory period because the rules are effective immediately upon
publication. It is appropriate, therefore, that affected parties should have an additional opportu-
nity to prepare for the final rule's effect, especially because the final rule differs substantially from
the interim rule that the parties have had to follow.
152. Under 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976), a court is required to review the administrative record when
determining the validity of agency action. Although there is some dispute about whether the
rulemaking record is what was before the agency when it issued rules or what is assembled for
review, see K. DAVIS, supra note 29, at §§ 6:5, 6:10, it is clear that the public comments received
by an agency constitute an important part of that record and, thus, additional comments provide
courts with a broader and more complete basis for review. See Rodway v. United States Dep't of
Agriculture, 514 F.2d 809, 817 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (the absence of comments makes the appellate
function impossible).
153. 598 F.2d at 643.
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tially revised interim rules would not leave unregulated the parties or
subjects covered by the rules. Rather, the interim rules would remain
in effect during this additional period until the final rules became effec-
tive.154
More important, the agencies' argument that requiring an addi-
tional notice and comment period for substantially revised rules would
unnecessarily delay the rulemaking process 155 is unpersuasive with re-
spect to interim rules. An agency that publishes interim rules has al-
ready avoided delay in the promulgation of effective rules. The agency,
by demonstrating good cause, avoids both extensive notice and com-
ment before promulgation of the interim rule and the usually required
thirty-day deferral period between publication of a rule and its effective
date. 156 An agency that is afforded these procedural advantages 5 7 has
no reason to complain about giving affected parties an additional op-
portunity to respond to substantial changes in the final rule. After all,
the affected parties have little or no opportunity to comment on the
interim rules before their promulgation, the substantial changes have a
significant impact on affected parties, and the interim rule remains in
effect during the additional notice and comment period.
V. CONCLUSION
Substantial change in an administrative rule between its proposed
and final stages raises serious questions about the adequacy of an
agency's notice and comment rulemaking procedures. An agency's
proposed rule, along with the submitted comments, may not give inter-
ested parties sufficient notice of the scope and substance of a substan-
tially revised final rule. Consistent with the recent developments of
more stringent rulemaking notice requirements, courts should strictly
review proposed rules that undergo substantial change to ensure that
the revisions are sufficiently related to both the proposed rule and the
comments. Strict review is particularly important in light of the notice
and comment procedures' purpose of producing reasoned and in-
formed administrative rulemaking.
154. Because an agency is required to demonstrate good cause before promulgating immedi-
ately effective interim rules, 5 U.S.C. § 553(d)(3) (1976), this showing of good cause permits the
interim rule to remain in effect until a permanent rule is promulgated and made effective. See
notes 20-22 supra and accompanying text.
155. See text accompanying notes 101-03 supra.
156. This avoidance assumes that the interim rule was properly promulgated in accordance
with the APA's good-cause exceptions. See notes 18-21 supra and accompanying text.
157. 5 U.S.C. § 553(d) (1976). A recent case reinforced the original intention of this section:
that the deferral period was meant to start upon publication of the rule as ultimately adopted and
not with publication of the proposed rule. Rowell v. Andrus, 631 F.2d 699 (10th Cir. 1980).
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Moreover, although courts have been reluctant to impose addi-
tional rulemaking procedures on agencies, 58 the significant conse-
quences that result from substantial changes in a long-standing interim
rule justify a more frequent imposition of an additional notice and
comment period when an agency publishes a final rule that differs sub-
stantially from its preceding interim rule. This additional period would
give parties affected by the agency's rule an opportunity to address the
rationality and desirability of the changes while providing courts with a
more complete record on which to review the substantive validity of the
changes. The end result would be greater public participation and bet-
ter informed agency rulemaking without a sacrifice of administrative
rulemaking efficiency.
Mark D. Shepard
158. Imposing an additional notice and comment period would not run afoul of the Supreme
Court's holding in Vermont Yankee because this additional court-imposed procedure is warranted
by a finding that the agency's notice of rulemaking fails to satisfy the purposes underlying the
APA's minimum notice provisions. See text accompanying notes 68-73 supra.
